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A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, in the case of Huawei Technologies v ZTE, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf 
(Landgericht Düsseldorf) referred a number of questions to the Court of Justice 
(ECJ).
1
 In particular, it asked the ECJ whether, and if so when, it might constitute an 
abuse of a dominant position contrary to Article 102 TFEU for a patent holder, in this 
case the holder of a standard-essential patent (SEP) which had given a commitment to 
license that SEP to any third party on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
(FRAND) terms, to seek an injunction against a potential licensee alleged to be 
infringing the patent. The case raises a number of difficult issues for resolution at the 
interface of antitrust and patent law and, especially the question of whether, and if so 
when, it is legitimate for competition law to encroach on exclusive patent rights.   
Sections B and C start by examining the background to the case, which is essential to 
understanding the questions raised and how they might be answered. They set out the 
factors that triggered the dispute in Huawei and examine core cases in which 
applications for injunctions made by FRAND-encumbered SEP-holders have had to 
be considered in the EU. It is seen that developments in the national courts, and before 
the European Commission (the Commission), support a fairly broad consensus that 
SEP-holders which have committed to licensing their patents on FRAND terms 
should not ordinarily be permitted to undermine the objectives of that commitment by 
obtaining an injunction against potential licensees willing to take a FRAND licence. 
Nonetheless, SEP-holders have been able to take advantage of favourable court 
processes in Germany to obtain injunctions to protect their SEPs and to prevent 
infringements of the patents by implementers of the standard in Germany. These cases 
are having implications for, and an impact on, implementers beyond Germany, 
throughout the EU. Concern about the compatibility of the conduct of SEP-holders 
with Article 102 TFEU was, however, what led the Landgericht Düsseldorf to make 
the reference to the CJ.  
Section D analyses the questions that have been put to the ECJ in Huawei 
Technologies against this background and considers how it might answer them. It 
suggests that even though EU precedent does not provide a clear solution to the 
questions posed, jurisprudence does set out some guiding principles which can be 
relied upon to construct an answer. Section E concludes that even if this matter is 
resolved, other pressing – and difficult – matters remain which require further 
development. As the FRAND obligation leaves vast scope for disagreement between 
SEP-holders and implementers over a number of fundamental issues, it is critical that 
mechanisms are put in place which will allow FRAND disputes to be resolved quickly 
and efficiently to the mutual benefit of SEP-holders and implementers. 
 
1
  C-170/13 (judgment pending). 
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B. BACKGROUND 
1. THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF STANDARD SETTING  
A number of industries, particularly the computing, communications and electronics 
industries,
2
 are dependent for successful operation on standards relating to “technical 
or quality requirements”3 which have been developed, negotiated and agreed upon by 
industry participants within a standard setting organisation (“SSO”). SSOs thus 
provide the opportunity for the advancement of the consumer welfare goal “on several 
levels.”4 By ensuring compatibility and interoperability between different 
manufacturers’ products or components within a system they permit and encourage 
the development of new and improved products, contribute to the enlargement of the 
market and enhance the utility of all products. Further, standard setting may facilitate 
competition among producers by reducing wasteful spending on technology and 
lowering costs for consumers. Firms involved in standard setting benefit both through 
production of goods that implement the standard and/or from licensing patented 
technology which contributes, and is essential, to the standard – standard essential 
patents (SEPs) - to other implementers.
5
  
Despite their pro-competitive potential, the practices of SSOs, and their participants, 
have come under the antitrust spotlight in recent years. Not only do standardisation 
agreements themselves require careful scrutiny to determine whether they are in fact 
pro-competitive or whether they may be likely to restrict competition, for example by 
excluding competitors of competing technology,
6
 but more recently there has been 
concern that the behaviour of firms participating in a legitimate standard setting 
 
2
  Many manufactures (eg of mobile phones, CDs, DVDs, computer memory, computer interfaces, 
USB memories, audio picture and video compression, Bluetooth, semiconductors, motor industry, 
biomedical, aerospace, shipping) depend for their products viability on compliance with industry 
standards. Indeed, standards are “ubiquitous throughout markets”, Committee in Intellectual 
Property Management in Standard-Setting Processes, National Research Council “Patent 
Challenges for Standard-Setting in the Global Economy: Lessons from Information and 
Communication Technology” (2013), 15. 
3
  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/01 (Horizontal Cooperation 
Guidelines), ¶ 257. 
4
  Broadcom Corp v Qualcomm Inc 501 F 3d 297 (3d Cir 2007), 308-09. 
5
  Who may or may not have participated in the standard’s development. In the Smartphone context, 
the “newer” players, such as Apple and Microsoft, have not the involvement in the technology 
involved in developing telecommunications standards as that of the longer-standing players, such 
as Nokia, Motorola and Ericsson, see infra Section B.1. 
6
  Although they provide the opportunity for efficiencies, by definition they eliminate competition 
from alternative technologies, restrict the competitive constraints exercised by future technologies 
and may also provide the opportunity for parties to such agreements to exclude or discriminate 
against other undertakings/ technologies, see Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, supra n 3, ¶¶ 
264-268 and 273-276, COMP/35.691 Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel [1999] OJ L 24/1, ¶ 147 and  Case 
96/82 etc IAZ v Commission [1983] ECR 3369 and eg, Allied Tube Conduit Corp v Indian Head, 
Inc 486 US 492 (1998). 
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process
7
 may raise antitrust problems. In particular, a core feature of the standard 
setting process is that although it may achieve public benefit in enabling 
interoperability, it may at the same time create barriers to entry and enable one or 
more undertakings that hold SEPs to gain market power and control over a standard,
8
 
thereby excluding competing technologies
9
 and allowing them to engage in “patent 
ambush” or post-standardisation practices designed to hold-up and foreclose 
downstream competitors.  For example, there has been anxiety about: 
 in the past at least, capture of the standard setting process or the conduct of a 
firm which has not disclosed the existence of a relevant patent, or which has 
engaged in some other misconduct, during a standardisation process (see for 
example the Commission’s and US Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) 
proceedings against Rambus);
10
 and/or  
 the conduct of a firm which is the holder of one or more SEPs and which is 
exploiting its (newly acquired or enlarged) market power as a mechanism for 
holding-up implementers and adversely impacting on innovation and the 
quality, variety and cost
11
 of products/ services available in a downstream 
market by, for example: a refusal to license implementers (who are locked in 
to the standard
12
 and may already have made specific and significant sunk 
investments to comply with it); or  
 an agreement to license such implementers only on conditions that are 
unreasonable (and in “excess of the patent holder’s true contribution’13) or 
discriminatory;
14
 and/or 
 
7
  Which may not have the same interests as each other or implementers that did not participate in the 
standard setting process 
8
  The standard setting process may confer substantial market power on a large number of SEP-
holders in related technology markets as once a standard has been set it becomes impossible for 
implementers to switch from SEPs to competing technologies, see eg, Qualcomm, supra n 4, 314. 
In contrast, prior to setting of the standard, alternative competing technologies could not command 
more than the competitive price, P Chappatte, “Frand Commitments – the Case for Antitrust 
Intervention” (2009) 5 European Competition Journal 319, 325. 
9
  Case COMP/38.636 Rambus, 9 December 2009 (Commitment’s Decision), FAQ Press Release on 
the Rambus commitments decision, MEMO IP/09/544; see also G Piesiewicz and R 
Schellingerhour, “Intellectual Property Rights in Standard Setting from a Competition Law 
Perspective” (2007) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter 36. 
10
   In the EU see IP/09/1897 and rejection of complaint by Hynix, Rambus 15 Jan 2010, on appeal 
Case T-149/10 Hynix v. Commission (judgment pending) and SPEECH/08/317 N. Kroes, Being 
open about standards 10 June 2008. See also Rambus FTC Docket No 9305 (2 August 2005), 
reversed Rambus v FTC 522 F.3d 456 (2008), cert denied 129 S Ct 1318 (2009) and FTC v. Bosch 
Consent Order of 23 April 2013, Docket No. C-4377. 
11
  Chappatte, supra n 8, 334 (“Excessive royalty rates will result in increased prices for consumers”). 
12
  Once technology has been incorporated into a standard, it is frequently not possible for 
implementers to work/ design around the patents, consequently SEPs confer enormous “hold-up” 
power, see supra n 8 and infra Section D.1.   
13
  M Lemley and C Shapiro, “Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking” (2007) 85 Texas Law Review 
1991, 1993. In November 2009 the Commission closed an investigation against Qualcomm in 
respect of unreasonably high pricing of royalties for technology which had become part of an 
industry standard, see 
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 royalty stacking, resulting from the fact that numerous complementary SEPs 
read on a product, or a component of it, and each of the SEP-holders charge a 
royalty which aggregated together, significantly exceeds the rate that would be 
charged by a single owner of all the patents (or the standard) involved and/or 
exceeds the level which would make it economically feasible to operate in the 
downstream market.  
These problems have been particularly rife in the mobile telecoms sector where vast 
numbers of patents (at least 250,000 SEPs and non-SEPS are estimated to read on the 
average smartphone
15
), patent holders and communications standards are involved,
16
 
the standards have a global scope and last for a significant period of time and the costs 
associated with switching to another standard are generally prohibitive.
17
 “Telecoms 
operators are therefore locked into a standard once they have invested in the relevant 
infrastructure.”18 The result is that patent enforcement by owners of standard essential 
technology, even that which plays a very minor part within a standard or which is 
weak (i.e. which may be likely to be found invalid if challenged), can threaten the 
successful operation of implementers in the downstream market – so affecting price, 
innovation and choice in that market. As one author has pointed out:
19
 
“This ‘Cournot Complement’ problem is aggravated by the ability of an owner of 
an insignificant patent that reads on one component of a complex multi-
component product to seek an injunction against the manufacture and sale of the 
entire product. As a result, even a very weak patent could command a high royalty 
in settlement from defendants afraid of gambling their entire product on a jury’s 
decision. This can be seen in reported demands by some SEP-holders for royalties 
exceeding 2 percent of the price of a finished product based on a small fraction of 
the SEPs reading on just one or two components of the product.” 
 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/index/by_nr_78.html#i39_247, see also Qualcomm, 
supra n 4 and Negotiated-Data Solution LLC FTC No 051 0094 (2008). 
14
  See eg, M Mariniello, “Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Terms: A Challenge 
for Competition Authorities” (2011) 7 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 523 and DW 
Carlton & AL Shampine “An Economic Interpretation of FRAND” (2013) 9 Journal of 
Competitino Law & Economics 531.  
15
  See J Kattan, “FRAND Wars and Section 2” (2013) 27(3) Antitrust 30, 31. 
16
  One report suggests that over 23,500 patents have been disclosed on the GSM and UMTS 
standards, R Bekkers and A Martinelli, “Knowledge positions in high-tech markets: Trajectories, 
standards, strategies and true innovators” (2012) 79 Technological Forecasting and Social Change 
1192, 1205. 
17
  Chappatte, supra n 8, 321 and 326. 
18
  Ibid, 333. 
19
  Kattan, supra n 15, 31 (“Indeed, in the only judicial decision to date to establish a F/RAND rate, 
the SEP owner sought a F/RAND rate that was 100 times the F/RAND rate that the court 
ultimately established for patents related to the Wi-Fi standard”; the judgment referred to is Case 
No C10-1823JLR Microsoft Corp v Motorola (WD Wash, 25 April 2013) (F/RAND Rate 
Decision), see also now Case No 11 C 9308 Innovatio IP Ventures Patent Litigation (ND Illinois, 
27 September 2013), infra Section E and J Kattan and C Wood “Standard-Essential Patents and the 
Problem of Hold-Up” in N Charbit and E Ramundo (eds) William E Kovacic – An Antitrust Tribute 
Liber Amicorum, Vol II (Institute of Competition Law, 2013). 
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2. FRAND LICENSING COMMITMENTS 
In order to minimise these risks many, or most, SSOs now require, encouraged and/or 
obliged by competition agencies and competition law, participating firms to disclose 
SEPs and to commit, as a condition of participating in a standard setting process, 
either to royalty-free licensing of any SEPs or, more commonly, their licensing on 
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND), or reasonable and non-
discriminatory (RAND),
20
 terms.
21
 Indeed, the Commission
22
 has stressed the 
importance of fair and open access to standards stating that “[i]n order to ensure 
effective access to the standard, the IPR policy would need to require participants 
wishing to have their IPRs included in the standard to provide an irrevocable 
commitment in writing to offer to license their essential IPR to all third parties on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (‘FRAND commitment’)…”.   
The SSO’s members as a whole benefit from an assurance that an individual SEP-
holder will not hold-up or compromise the success of the standard, and consumers’ 
acceptance of it, by exercising market power. The FRAND commitment thus 
precludes private profit-maximizing by a SEP owner which “could impede the success 
of the standard, reducing profits for other SEP owners and for implementers and 
decreasing consumer surplus through higher prices and reduced output. Because many 
SEP owners have this private incentive to charge royalties that in aggregate lower the 
welfare of SEP owners and implementers alike, these parties find themselves in a 
prisoners’ dilemma-like strategic situation in which they are likely to be worse off 
unless SEP owners can credibly commit ex ante to restrain their ex post 
opportunism”.23  
Individual SEP-holders also benefit as, even though they voluntarily agree to “waive 
some of their statutory rights they would otherwise have as patent owners”24 and to 
licence their standardised technology at a reasonable rate of royalty, a higher volume 
of licences is anticipated for patents included within a standard (a royalty may be 
demanded from any user of the standard).  
 
20
  Arguably, the word “fair” adds nothing to the requirement that the terms must be reasonable; they 
both simply reflect the requirement that the patent holder should receive a royalty that reflects the 
value of the technology provided, see eg, J Farrell, J Hayes, C Shapiro and T Sullivan, “Standard 
Setting, Patents, and Hold-up” (2007) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 603. 
21
  See discussion of the approaches of differing SSOs to IPR issues in “Patent Challenges for 
Standard-Setting in the Global Economy”, supra n 2, section 2. 
22
  Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, supra n 3, ¶¶ 279 and 285, see also infra n 67 and ETSI IPR 
Policy, art 6 (recognising that to ensure the effectiveness of the FRAND commitment, participating 
IPR holders who provide such a commitment must be required to ensure that any company to 
which the IPR owner transfers its IPR is bound by that commitment) and  speech of R Hesse, “Six 
‘Small’ Proposals for SSOs before Lunch” (10 October 2012) making proposals for changes to 
SSO policies designed to benefit competition and reduce risk of exploitation of SEPs. 
23
  J Ratliff & DL Rubinfeld, “The Use and Threat of Injunctions in the RAND Context” [2013] 9(1) 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 1, 5. 
24
  Ibid, 4. 
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The Intellectual Property Right (IPR) policy of European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI),
25
 for example, which devises standards ensuring the 
compatibility and interoperability of products in the information and communications 
technology sector (including GSM, third generation (3G – or Uniform Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS)) and fourth generation (4G- or Long Term 
Evolution (LTE)) standards) requires: that each member use its reasonable endeavours 
to inform ETSI of essential IPRs or which might be essential if its proposal for a 
standard is adopted and to grant irrevocable licences to such IPRs on FRAND 
conditions.
26
  
3. THE LIMITATIONS OF FRAND LICENSING COMMITMENTS AND THE RULES OF 
SSOS 
Although FRAND commitments are important to ensure the success of standards and 
to minimise the risk of hold-up, it is well-known that they have not precluded 
problems from arising in practice. Many SSO rules currently leave open the answer to 
a number of complex questions, including:  
 how valid patents can be identified and invalid assertions quickly weeded out;  
 how infringement can be tested in relation to a portfolio of SEPS (how it can 
be determined whether over-declarations of essentiality have been made); 
 whether and how FRAND commitments can be enforced, initially27 or 
following transfer of the SEP to a third party;
28
  
 exactly how a FRAND royalty can be assessed (they are not generally defined 
by SSOs and patentees and implementers – particularly “pure” implementers 
which do not own SEPs (or a significant portfolio of SEPs) – are likely to have 
very different views on this matter); and  
 what should happen when negotiations over these issues break down, perhaps 
because: the SEP-holder demands excessive or “unfair” terms;29 the 
implementer refuses to pay a reasonable royalty; and/or the parties simply 
cannot agree what a FRAND royalty should be. In particular, whether, and if 
so when, might it be justifiable for the owner of a SEP, in spite of its 
 
25
  For a discussion of other SSO’s IPR policies see eg, “Patent Challenges for Standard-Setting in the 
Global Economy”, supra n 2, and Chappatte, supra n 8.  
26
  See ETSI IPR Policy, Arts 4.1 and 6.1. 
27
  In Microsoft v Motorola, supra n 19, Judge Robart held that an implementer could rely on the 
contract as a beneficiary of it. In contrast, German courts have regularly held the FRAND licensing 
declarations do not give rise to contractual obligations, but are declaratory in nature and do not go 
beyond the competition law based obligation to grant licenses, see eg, General Instrument Corp v 
Microsoft Deutschland GmbH Regional Court of Mannheim, 2nd Civil Division, 2 May 2012, file 
no. 2 O 240/11.  
28
  See eg, In re N-Data (FTC, 22 Sept 2008), and assessments of the  Google/Motorola and Rockstar 
consortium/Nortel mergers, US DOJ “Statement on its Decision to Close its Investigations of 
Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisition of Certain 
Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd.” (13 February 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-at-210.html accessed on 24 December 2013, and 
Case COMP/M.6381 Google/Motorola Mobility 13 February 2012. 
29
  See eg, Qualcomm Inc v Broadcom Corp 539 F Supp 2d 1214 (SD Cal 2007). 
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voluntarily commitment to licence its technology on FRAND terms to all 
interested parties, to seek an injunction against an entity utilising the standard 
and so presumed to be infringing that SEP after negotiations have faltered.  
These outstanding difficulties directly raise the important issue of the extent to which 
the FRAND commitment, alone or in combination with the application of the antitrust 
rules, operates as a constraint on the behaviour of an SEP-holder by affecting its 
general right as a patentee, to exercise its exclusive right over its new and inventive 
product or process, by deciding (a) whether or not to grant a licence to its invention to 
an implementer at all;
30
 and (b) if so, on what terms? How should intellectual property 
law (which generally incentivises invention through the provision of a period of 
exclusivity to patent owners), contract law and antitrust laws interact together? 
It is arguable that SSOs themselves should be doing more to refine and clarify their 
policies to prevent hold-ups.
31
 The reality is, however, that, at least in the mobile 
communications sector, to date relevant SSOs have not been able to achieve the 
necessary consensus required, have not developed robust dispute resolution 
mechanisms capable of dealing with the controversial issues arising between major 
technology companies, and have not demonstrated the will to do so. These issues are, 
therefore, now frequently arising both before courts, in the context of civil litigation 
between private parties, and before competition agencies, the recipients of complaints 
about the conduct of SEP-holders 
In 2009, Philipe Chappatte wrote in this journal that there was an urgent need for clear 
precedent confirming the nature of a FRAND commitment. Otherwise “there is a real 
risk … that national courts will apply Article [102] in an inconsistent manner when 
essential patents are enforced”.32 Since then the question of whether a SEP-holder 
should be entitled to an injunction to protect its exclusive right and prevent 
infringement of a FRAND-encumbered SEP has been litigated in several fora and 
considered by a number of competition agencies and commentators, including Nicolas 
Petit in the previous edition of this journal.
33
 The questions of how to deal with 
validity and infringement issues and exactly what a FRAND obligation means in 
licensing terms (in particular, how a FRAND royalty rate is determined) are, however, 
still being worked through. Although there are indications that courts are prepared to 
intervene in FRAND disputes and to set FRAND terms,
34
 many of the key issues in 
this area remain to be resolved. Consequently, as wrangles occur and FRAND 
negotiations break down, the importance of the question of whether an injunction is 
 
30
  The European Enforcement Directive, Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L157/70, 
Art 9(1) requires that injunctions for patent infringements are available as a matter of Member 
State law. 
31
  See further section E. 
32
  Chappatte, n 8, 335. 
33
  See N Petit, “Injunctions for FRAND-Pledged SEPs; The Quest for an Appropriate Test of Abuse 
under Article 102 TFEU” [2013] 9(3) European Competition Journal 677. 
34
  See eg, IPCom v Nokia [2012] EWHC 1446 (Ch) and Vringo v ZTE [2013] EWHC 1591 (Pat) and 
infra section E. 
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available to prevent possible infringements by implementers, and whether competition 
law can play a role in these issues, has come to the forefront.  
C. LICENSING OF SEPS IN THE MOBILE TELEPHONY MARKET: EU 
PROCEEDINGS 
1. THE SMARTPHONE WARS 
Initially, there was relatively little patent litigation in the mobile telephony markets; 
most of the core players, for example, Samsung, Nokia, Ericsson, Motorola, Alcatel-
Lucent and Qualcomm, were both SEP-holders and implementers in the market and 
cross-licensed each other licences to a portfolio of their patents.  
The position changed, however, following: (1) the entry into the market of 
implementers, for example, Apple (with iPhone), Google (with its open source 
Android operating system
35
) and Microsoft (with Windows Mobile) which did not 
have the networks of patents essential to ETSI standards
36
 as their competitors 
(although Apple and Microsoft, for example, hold a significant portfolio of design and 
software patents which are not standard-essential (non-SEPs)); and (2) when some of 
the original players’ either sold off their patent portfolios to patent assertion entities 
(PAEs)
37
 and/or their position in the final product market changed or began to decline. 
These developments, and the change in incentives and the shift in bargaining position 
between SEP-holders and implementers they created, have led to an explosion of 
disputes and litigation worldwide raising a plethora of contract, patent and antitrust 
issues both in relation to the infringement of non-SEPs and SEPs, which have 
included the question of whether a SEP-holder should be able to enforce its exclusive 
rights through the bringing of an injunction claim in court. 
2.  NATIONAL SUITS  
A number of EU national courts, in line with the approach taken by some US courts,
38
 
have declined to grant injunctions automatically to FRAND-encumbered SEP-holders. 
 
35
  The Android operating system (developed by Android Inc which was subsequently purchased by 
Google) is designed primarily for touchscreen mobile devices and forms part of a broader project 
devoted to advance open standards for mobile devices. 
36
  Although Google has subsequently acquired Motorola and its patent portfolio and Apple, 
Microsoft, RIM and Oracle acquired, through their Rockstar consortium, Nortel, see supra n 28. 
37
  Firms whose business is primarily to purchase and assert patents, typically against operating 
companies with products on the market. Given the high prices that many PAEs have paid for 
portfolios of patents, they are likely to expect to extract high licensing fees. 
38
  See eBay v MercExchange 547 US 388 (2006) (injunctions for patent infringements are not 
automatic but based on specified criteria) and Apple v Motorola (ND of Illinois, 22 June 2012) 
(Judge Posner) (“by committing to license its patents on FRAND terms, Motorola committed to 
license the ‘898 to anyone willing to pay a FRAND royalty and thus implicitly acknowledged that 
a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to use that patent. How could it be permitted to 
enjoin Apple from using an invention that it contends Apple must use if it wants to make a cell 
phone with UMTS telecommunications capability—without which it would not be a cell phone… 
A FRAND royalty would provide all the relief to which Motorola would be entitled if it proved 
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Rather they have been cautious about granting permanent injunctions in 
circumstances where the implementer against whom the injunction is sought has not 
refused to pay a royalty that meets the FRAND requirement. In the Netherlands, for 
example, the District Court of the Hague rejected an application by Samsung for an 
injunction to prevent Apple’s sales of iPhones and iPads in the Netherlands and 
damages.
39
 Although Samsung alleged that Apple was infringing a number of its 
(FRAND encumbered) patents,
40
 relating to technology essential to the 3G standard 
developed in Europe by ETSI,  the court denied the claim on the basis that (i) 
Samsung had only made one offer – a royalty of 2.4 per cent on the entire price of the 
final Apple products – and had not responded to Apple’s counter-offers or otherwise 
declared FRAND terms for its portfolio of UMTS SEPs; and (ii) Apple had not acted 
as an unwilling licensee. The court did accept that a patentee that had agreed to grant 
FRAND licences might be able to enforce its patent rights in certain circumstances, 
but held that it would not be permitted to do so in so far as seeking the injunction 
would breach the FRAND obligation (for example, during negotiations on a FRAND 
licence) and so constitute an abuse of power or breach of pre-contractual good faith. 
Rather, the court took the view that the threat of an injunction in this situation would 
put Apple under improper pressure to agree, during licence negotiations, to non-
FRAND conditions.  
An Italian and a French court
41
 have similarly rejected injunction applications by 
Samsung, and in IPCom v Nokia
42
 Roth J, in the High Court of England & Wales, 
declined to grant an injunction sought by IPCom (a PAE or non-trading entity) against 
Nokia in relation to a patent essential to the 3G standard and which would exclude 
Nokia from selling its products in the UK. Given that Nokia had declared itself 
willing to take, and to be entitled to, a licence in relation to valid patents on FRAND 
terms and IPCom acknowledged that it had made a FRAND declaration, the judge 
failed to see why an injunction should be granted.   
A particular problem that is arising, however, is that a significant amount of the EU 
litigation is now occurring in Germany. Not only is Germany the biggest market in the 
EU for mobile telephony products, but the patent litigation environment there has 
made it an especially attractive forum for patent holders in general, and SEP-holders 
in particular. Indeed, the procedure in Germany enables patent infringement cases to 
be resolved quickly, cheaply and in a relatively patent-holder friendly way.  
 
infringement of the ‘898 patent, and thus it is not entitled to an injunction”18-19). This judgment is 
on appeal. See also Judge Robart’s ruling in Motorola v Microsoft, supra n 19, and infra n 134. 
39
  DC Hague, Mar 14 2012. See also the approach of the US courts, supra n 38 and infra n 43.  
40
  Apple also challenged the validity of a number of the patents asserted by Samsung. 
41
  See http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/01/italian-court-denies-samsung-motion-for.html,  and 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2011/12/french-court-denies-samsung-request-for.html, accessed 1 
November 2013 and eg BB Greenfield, H Scheider and JJ Mueller, “Beyond the Water’s Edge: A 
Survey of Recent Non-U.S. Decisions” (2013) 27(3) Antitrust 50, 52 
42
  Supra n 34 (under English law the grant of an injunction is a discretionary remedy. Although an 
injunction will generally be granted where the invasion of a property right is demonstrated, 
damages may be given in substitution in certain circumstances, see Shelfer v City of London 
Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287).  
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For example, the bifurcated court process that operates in Germany means that patent 
infringement cases are heard by specialist patent chambers of the Higher District 
Courts separately from, and regularly in advance of, issues relating to the validity of 
the patent (heard by the Federal Patent Court). Further, there is a strong legal tradition 
of providing security to IPR holders. Consequently, the former courts take the view 
that German law, rather than permitting discretion to be exercised,   requires the grant 
of an injunction to a patent holder whose patent is found to have been infringed
43
 
unless:  
(a) an extremely high degree of likelihood of invalidity before the Federal Parent 
Court can be established. This fact arguably encourages filing of marginal patents and 
the over-declaration of SEPs whilst at the same time encouraging the settlement of 
patent disputes relating to them, even in cases of weak patents which might, if 
litigated, end up being revoked by the German Federal Patent Court;
44
 or 
(b) a defendant can establish that by refusing to conclude a licence the claimant has 
abused its dominant position (since conduct prohibited by antitrust law must not be 
ordered by state courts). In the Orange-Book-Standard
45
 case the German Supreme 
Court (Bundesgerichtshof) accepted that such an abuse would occur only in very 
limited circumstances, where the party seeking a licence makes, and remains bound 
by, an unconditional offer to conclude a licence contract with the patent-holder on 
terms which, if rejected by the patent-holder, would amount to a violation of antitrust 
law (the implementer has to be willing to pay (into court deposit) as if it were a 
licensee and to render accounts). The background to this case was that the validity of 
the patent (which was not a FRAND-encumbered SEP
46
) had already been 
established, infringement was not contested and many licences had been granted at a 
published FRAND rate. This judgment has, however, subsequently been used as 
precedent by lower courts hearing disputes involving FRAND encumbered SEPs in 
circumstances where the validity of the patent(s) in dispute has not been fully 
reviewed and where there is a wide divergence of views on what the FRAND rate 
should be. Further, the Orange-Book-Standard has been interpreted inconsistently by 
 
43
  See PatG, s 139(1) (German Patent Law) and T Körber, Standard Essential Patents, FRAND 
Commitments and Competition Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2013), 186. This is in stark contrast to 
the position eg, in the US (see eBay Inc v MercExchange, LLC 547 US 388 (2006)) and in some 
other Member States where the courts exercise more nuanced approaches and are more cautious 
about granting final injunctions, see further especially supra n 38 and text.  
44
  According to statistics published by the German Patent Court in its annual reports (2006-2011), 
more than 75% of patents considered by the German Federal Patent Court are found to be wholly 
or partially invalid. 
45
  BGH, 6 May 2009, KZR 39/06, GRUR 2009 694. See J Straus, "Patent Application: Obstacle for 
Innovation and Abuse of Dominant Position under Article 102 TFEU?" (2010) 1(3) Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 189. 
46
  See view of German Supreme Court Judge, Prof Dr Bornkamm (that Orange-Book did not have to 
be the final word on the case and that a readjustment might be required) reported in Mlex, “EU 
court review of tech-patent injunctions shouldn’t delay antitrust cases, top German judge says”, 13 
May 2013. See also Commission Memo 13/403 (‘The Supreme Court's [OrangeBook] ruling did 
not specifically relate to SEPs. The Commission's preliminary view is that an interpretation of that 
ruling whereby a willing licensee is essentially not entitled to challenge the validity and 
essentiality of the SEPs in question is potentially anti-competitive.’) 
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those courts, but generally in a way which makes it exceedingly difficult to raise a 
FRAND defence to a patent infringement suit. To avoid an injunction, an implementer 
will ordinarily have to: renounce any defences in respect of the patents, for example, 
in relation to the validity of the SEP
47
 and agree to a termination clause in the case of 
a validity challenge; unconditionally offer terms to the SEP-holder, the refusal or 
which would constitute a clear violation of Article 102 (ie which is a clearly excessive 
royalty rate);
48
 render “super-FRAND” payments in respect of his past use of the 
patent
49
 (the amount of which is to be determined by the SEP-holder at his fair 
discretion); and pay a sufficient deposit for damages “in escrow”. In contrast, there is 
no duty on the SEP-holder to engage with offers made by the party seeking a licence 
or to make counter-offers or to disclose terms of licences with others.
50
  
The net result is that, in practice, lower German courts have rarely been willing to 
deny injunctions sought by SEP-holders against implementers, even where the latter 
have made offers to make FRAND payments and declared themselves willing to 
accept a licence on independently arbitered FRAND terms. In Motorola v Microsoft,
51
 
for example, the District Court of Mannheim (Landgericht Mannhein) granted 
Motorola an injunction against Microsoft based on an SEP and in Motorola Mobility v 
Apple,
52
 it also ordered Apple to cease and desist offering and/or delivering mobile 
devices using the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) standard, which incorporated 
the claimant’s SEPs, even though Apple had made numerous licence offers to the 
claimant to pay a royalty on FRAND terms. The cases do not ordinarily get appealed 
to higher courts, as in the end implementers agree licences in order to avoid the 
potentially devastating impact of the injunction on their business.  
These decisions of the lower German courts are, to a considerable extent, 
emasculating the more nuanced approach of the EU national courts outside of 
Germany. First, SEP-holders have sometimes sought to trump the application of legal 
principles in other national courts by relying on the outcome of German litigation to 
argue that defendants are estopped from raising defences to patent enforcement 
proceedings in that jurisdiction.
53
 Secondly, the willingness demonstrated by the 
 
47
  Motorola Mobility Inc v Apple Sales International Regional Court of Mannheim, 7
th
 Civil 
Division, 9 December 2011, file no 7 O 122/11 and Karlsruhe Court of Appeal, 30 January 2013, 
file no 6 U 136/11. In contrast, the Commission takes the view that the fact that a potential licensee 
challenges validity, essentiality or infringement of the SEP does not make it an unwilling licensee 
if it otherwise agrees to be bound by FRAND licence terms (determined by a third party), 
MEMO/13/403, see further infra Section C. 
48
  General Instrument Corp v Microsoft Deutschland GmbH, supra n 27. 
49
  Motorola v Apple, supra n 47. 
50
  See eg, “Mannheim court continues to weaken the FRAND defense -- bad news for Apple, Nokia, 
HTC, others”, http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/02/mannheim-court-continues-to-weaken.html 
accessed on 24 December 2013. 
51
  General Instrument Corp v Microsoft, supra n 48. A US District Court, however, barred Motorola 
from enforcing this injunction pending its determination of an appropriate royalty rate, see 
Microsoft Corp v Motorola, Inc (2012), aff’d 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir 2012), see also infra n 145. 
52
  Motorola v Apple, supra n 47. 
53
  National judges may give some deference to orders made in other jurisdictions. The question of 
whether principles of res judicata should be applied in relation to German judgments was raised in 
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German courts to grant injunctions to SEP-holders, combined with the fact that 
Germany is a major commercial market, has conferred significant leverage on SEP-
holders which some have been successfully utilising to secure EU-wide licences to 
their SEP-portfolios on advantageous terms. Faced with the prospect of having 
products unavoidably and permanently barred from a major market such as Germany, 
many smartphone manufactures have agreed to pay significant royalties demanded by 
SEP-holders on a broader territorial basis. For example, Motorola has been able to 
demand a 2.25 per cent royalty, and Samsung a 2.4 per cent royalty, of final products 
implementing the standard, despite the fact that there are vast numbers of other 
patents which read on 3G/UMTS and related standards.
54
  
German patent courts are, consequently, coming to be seen the venue of choice for 
resolving global patent disputes, (see in particular discussion of Huawei 
Technologies
55
 below, involving a patent dispute arising between two Chinese 
electronics companies).  
3. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATIONS IN SAMSUNG AND MOTOROLA 
The Commission is currently in the process of investigating Samsung and Motorola 
Mobility for possibly breaching Article 102 - in particular through their use of the 
court processes in Germany.
56
 These investigations indicate that the Commission is 
concerned to ensure that SEP-holders honour their FRAND obligations and that it 
believes that Samsung’s: 
“seeking and enforcing of an injunction against Apple in Germany on the 
basis of its mobile phone standard-essential patents (‘SEPs’) amounts to an 
abuse of a dominant position prohibited by EU antitrust rules. While recourse 
to injunctions is a possible remedy for patent infringements, such conduct 
may be abusive where SEPs are concerned and the potential licensee is 
willing to enter into a licence on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory 
(so-called ‘FRAND’) terms. In such a situation, the Commission considers at 
this stage that dominant SEP-holders should not have recourse to injunctions, 
which generally involve a prohibition to sell the product infringing the patent, 
 
IPCom v Nokia, see supra n 34. The US District Court, in Microsoft Corp v Motorola, Inc (2012), 
aff’d 696 F 3d 872 (9th Cir 2012) barred Motorola from enforcing the German court’s injunction 
(supra n 47), pending its determination of an appropriate royalty rate. 
54
  Kattan and Wood, supra n 19 (“In Motorola’s litigation against Microsoft, the court found that the 
reasonable royalty for the company’s Wi-Fi SEPs was $0.03471 per unit and $0.0555 per unit for 
its H.264 SEPs,33 a tiny fraction of the $6 to $8 per unit that a 2.25% royalty would have 
produced”, see infra section E). 
55
  C-170/13 (judgment pending). 
56
  Article 102 prohibits any abuse by one of more dominant undertakings of a dominant position held 
in the EU, or a substantial part of it which affects trade between Member States. See Case 
COMP/39939 Samsung – Enforcement of UMTS standards essential patents (IP/12/89) and Case 
COMP/ 39985 Motorola (IP/12/345). A Statement of Objections was sent to Motorola on 6 May 
2013, IP/13/406. See also eg, speech of J Almunia, “Abuse of dominance – a view from the EU”, 
SPEECH/13/758, Fordham’s Competition Law Institute Annual Conference, New York, 27 
September 2013. 
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in order to distort licensing negotiations and impose unjustified licensing 
terms on patent licensees. Such misuse of SEPs could ultimately harm 
consumers. …The preliminary view … does not question the availability of 
injunctive relief for SEP-holders outside the specific circumstances present in 
this case, for example in the case of unwilling licensees.”57  
In Motorola, the Commission also set out its preliminary view that an interpretation 
of the Orange-Book-Standard “whereby a willing licensee is essentially not entitled 
to challenge the validity and essentiality of the SEPs in question is potentially anti-
competitive.”58  Although the Commission is yet either to clarify its thinking as to the 
“nature” of the abuse or to adopt a final decision in either of these cases – indeed, it is 
in the process of market testing commitments in Samsung
59
 - the preliminary views 
set out seem to reflect an emerging “consensus among competition authorities that 
injunctive relief in connection with a [F]RAND-encumbered SEP should be a remedy 
of last resort”.60  
4. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES
61
 
The approach adopted by the lower German courts now seems to be sufficiently out of 
kilter with that adopted by courts in other EU jurisdictions and the views currently 
being expressed by the Commission,
62
 that concern is growing that German law may 
be making injunctions available in circumstances in which the seeking, and 
subsequent enforcing, of the injunction violates Article 102. If this is correct, then 
 
57
  IP/13/406 and see eg, speech of J Almunia, “Competition Policy in times of restructuring”, 
SPEECH/12/487, Chatham House Conference - Competition policy in global markets: Efficiencies 
and remedies in lean times, London, 22 June 2012 (“use of injunctions against willing licensees to 
extract better terms in the case of standard-related IPRs is potentially abusive and can cause 
disproportionate damage”).  
58
  Commission sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on potential misuse of mobile 
phone standard-essential patents - Questions and Answers 6 May 2013 and see supra n 46. 
59
  Although there is now considerable concern that the Commission is too frequently using the 
commitments procedure to close novel antitrust cases, meaning it does not have to develop legal 
analysis in a way which will prove its case or help to clarify the law (see eg, P Marsden, “The 
Emperor’s Clothes Laid Bare: Commitments Creating the Appearance of Law, While Denying 
Access to Law’ CPI Antitrust Chronicle October 2013 (1)), the reference to the ECJ in Huawei 
should mean that legal principle is developed in these circumstances. Further, an oral hearing has 
been held in relation to the Motorola proceedings, see reports on MLex, “Motorola, Apple spar 
over ‘willingness’ in patent negotiations at EU hearing”, available at 
http://www.mlex.com/EU/Content.aspx?ID=2158673.  
60
  “Patent Challenges for Standard-Setting in the Global Economy”, supra n 2, 96, see J Kanter, 
“What Difference a Year Makes: An Emerging Consensus on the Treatment of Standard-Essential 
Patents” (2013)(1) CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1, 3, see also eg, commitments agreed with FTC in 
Decision and Order Motorola Mobility & Google Inc (3 July 2013), Decision and Order, Robert 
Bosch GmbH (26 November 2012 24 April 2013) and R Knox, “Hesse Suggests Antitrust Could be 
Useful in Addressing Patent Abuses”, (2013) Global Competition Rev, available at, 
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/34237/hesse-suggests-antitrust-useful-addressing-
patent-abuses/ accessed on 24 December 2013.  
61
  C-170/13 (judgment pending). 
62
  And the views of the US courts and antitrust agencies, see supra nn 38 and 60. 
  Page 15 
German courts may be in breach of their duty of sincere cooperation to the EU;
63
 they 
have a duty to guarantee real and
 
effective judicial protection for EU rights
64
 and an 
obligation not to apply provisions of national law which contravene EU law.
65
   
This type of uncertainty has led the Landgericht Düsseldorf to stay patent litigation 
between Huawei and ZTE
66
 and to refer a number of questions to the ECJ relating to 
the application of Article 102 to the conduct of SEP-holders. Essentially, the 
questions referred ask whether: 
 a SEP-holder who has made a FRAND commitment to an SSO commits an abuse 
of a dominant position if it brings an injunction claim in court: (a) where the 
proceedings are against patent infringer which has declared a willingness to 
negotiate such a licence (and if so how can a willingness to negotiate be 
established and must particular qualitative or time requirements be established)?; 
or (b) only where the proceedings are against an implementer who has presented 
an acceptable, unconditional offer to the SEP-holder to enter into a licensing 
agreement which the patentee cannot refuse without unfairly impeding the patent 
infringer or discriminating against it, and the patent infringer takes steps to act in 
accordance with such an offer with respect to past infringements in anticipation of 
any licence to be granted prior to use?; 
 if the fulfilment of the infringer’s obligations arising from the prospective licence 
that is to be granted is a prerequisite for the abuse of a dominant position, do 
particular acts have to be fulfilled, for example, do past infringements have to be 
disclosed and account made for past acts of use?  
In short, therefore, the ECJ is being asked whether the Orange-Book-Standard 
“framework” (as it has later been interpreted by the lower courts in Germany) is 
sufficient to prevent abusive conduct by SEP-holders or whether Article 102 applies 
more stringently to constrain the ordinary rights of IPR owners, where the IP at issue 
is a FRAND encumbered SEP. Because of the size and importance of the German 
economy, the way in which this question is answered is critical.  
 
63
  See Treaty or European Union, Art 4(3) which provides that the Union and Member States are to 
assist each other in carrying out tasks flowing from the Treaties and that Member States “shall take 
any appropriate measure . . . to ensure fulfilment of the obligations . . .” and “shall facilitate the 
achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the 
attainment of the Union’s objectives”. 
64
  See eg, Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, 
especially para. 23 and Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v 
Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, ¶5 
65
  See also Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297 and Case C-198/01 Consorzio 
Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato [2003] ECR I-
8055 (the ECJ stressed that the primacy of EU law required any provision of national law which 
contravenes an EU rule to be disapplied and that the duty applied to all organs of the State, 
including administrative authorities). 
66
  Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, Order of 21 March 2013, file no 4b O 104/12, GRUR Int. 
2013, 547. (Founded on an allegation of infringement by ZTE of SEPs declared to ETSI (and 
subject to a FRAND obligation) for 4G/LTE cellular telecoms standard). 
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D. RESOLVING THE QUESTIONS RAISED BEFORE THE ECJ IN 
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES: FRAND, INJUNCTIONS AND ARTICLE 102 
1. DOMINANCE 
This paper concentrates on the question of abuse – the focus of the Huawei reference 
– but notes that Article 102 applies, of course, only if it is established that the 
undertaking alleged to have engaged in abusive conduct holds a dominant position. 
There seems little doubt, however, that standard setting process can confer market 
power and a dominant position on SEP-holders and, indeed, a large group of them. It 
has already been seen that numerous patented technologies may be “essential” to a 
standard. Owners of such patents are likely to acquire market power after the standard 
is adopted if it subsequently becomes impossible for implementers to invent or design 
around the patent (the standard constitutes a barrier to entry to the market as it is 
commercially indispensable to comply with it). In the mobile telephony sector, 
manufacturers of 3G or 4G mobile devices are generally locked-in and unable to 
design around standards as they must be able to certify that their product is standard 
compliant in order to operate on UMTS and LTE networks. In these markets therefore 
SEP-holders may frequently be found to be dominant.
67
 
2. CAN SEEKING AND/OR ENFORCING AN INJUNCTION CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE?  
(a)  Exploitative and/or exclusionary conduct? 
The right to exclude and to seek and obtain an injunction against an infringer are 
generally integral aspects of IP and essential rights of an IPR-holder designed to 
protect its incentive to innovate and to deter infringements of its exclusive rights. The 
antitrust concern in the Huawei context is, however, that if, post-standardisation, a 
SEP-holder is allowed to rely on its IPR to seek and obtain an injunction, it may be 
permitted to use its market power, acquired from, or enhanced by, the standardisation 
process, to hold-up locked-in implementers by refusing a licence or licensing only on 
unfair or discriminatory terms, the exact mischief the FRAND commitment was 
designed to prevent. There is no previous jurisprudence of the EU courts which 
specifically considers whether such conduct may constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position. Nonetheless, the issues raised by this case do have similarities to those raised 
in a number of established categories of abuse. Indeed, the ECJ has previously had to 
consider other circumstances in which the exercise of essential rights by IPR-owners 
might infringe Article 102 and the Commission, in its statements in relation to 
Samsung and Motorola, has drawn attention both to the exploitative and exclusionary 
nature of such conduct. 
 
67
  See eg, Chappatte, supra n 8, 333, supra nn 8-18 and accompanying text and Google/Motorola, 
supra n 28, ¶ 54. Indeed, it is because of the recognition that market power may be obtained by 
participations to the creation of a standard that the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, supra n 3, 
provide that for standard setting agreement to fall outside Article 101(1), the SSOs IPR policy 
should ensure SEP holders make FRAND commitments (see especially ¶¶ 269 and 285 and supra 
n 22). It is also important to consider whether the exercise of market power is constrained by buyer 
power, for example where the implementer owns blocking patents, see R O’Donoghue and J 
Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (Hart Publishing, 2
nd
 edn, 2013), 703. 
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Although it is true that: (i) an important concern is that the SEP-holder might seek an 
injunction as a mechanism for holding-up implementers through extracting “unfair”, 
and/or “discriminatory”, licensing terms which the implementer would not accept in 
ordinary circumstances;
68
 and (ii) that Article 102 itself specifically prohibits a 
dominant firm from engaging in exploitative conduct, in particular through “imposing 
unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions” (Article 102(a)) or 
engaging in discriminatory behaviour (“applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage” (Article 102(c)); the Commission, like many other competition 
agencies, rarely intervenes in cases which purely involve unfair pricing
69
 or 
secondary-line price discrimination.
70
 Apart from the regulatory nature of any such 
intervention and, for example, broader concerns as to when intervention of this type is 
desirable,
71
 the difficulties involved in determining whether selling prices imposed are 
unfair (or excessive) are acute (see further section E below). Rather, the Commission 
has generally has preferred to focus its resources on exclusionary conduct – that is 
 
68
  “[T]he threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of the 
patent holder’s true economic contribution. Such royalty over-charges act as a tax on the products 
incorporating the patent technology thereby impeding rather than promoting innovation.” Lemley 
and  Shapiro, supra n 12, 1993. See also MA Lemley and C Shapiro, “A Simple Approach to 
Setting Reasonably Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents” (March 2013) Stanford Public Law 
Working Paper No 2243026, FTC Commissioner Ramirez’s prepared statement of the FTC to the 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, concerning, “Oversight of the Impact on 
Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential Patents” 11 July 2012, (“A royalty 
negotiation that occurs under the threat of an injunction … may be weighted heavily in favor of the 
patent-holder in a way that is in tension with the RAND commitment”), Kattan and Wood, supra n 
19 and the discussion, infra section E, of the US cases, Microsoft v Motorola and Innovatio, supra 
n 19, where the courts awarded dramatically lower royalty levels than those demanded by the SEP-
holders. 
69
  For the view that the seeking of an injunction should be analysed as an exploitative abuse, see U 
Petrovčič, “Patent hold-up and the limits of competition law: A Trans-Atlantic perspective”, 
(2013) 5 CMLR 1363. In Cases C-403 and 429/08 Premier League Ltd v. QC Leisure and Murphy 
v. Media Protection Services Ltd 4 October 2011, ¶¶ 108-109, the ECJ made clear that the 
ownership of an IPR does not necessarily guarantee the right for the owner to demand the highest 
possible remuneration - only appropriate remuneration which must be reasonable in relation to the 
economic value of the service provided. Further, in Rambus the Commission objected to excessive 
royalties levied by Rambus subsequent to a patent ambush. The case was settled, however, after 
Rambus committed to reduce its royalties, see supra n 9, see also Case 238/87 AB Volvo v Erik 
Veng [1988] ECR 6211 and infra n 77.  
70
  Indeed, in this context the Commission’s view is that the national courts or arbitrators are better 
equipped to deal with the question of what constitutes a reasonable royalty and it has focussed its 
attention on the question of whether the seeking of an injunction constitutes an abuse. But see the 
preliminary order of the Competition Commission of India, which is investigating whether 
Ericsson’s royalty rates are excessive, discriminatory and in breach of FRAND terms, infra section 
E, especially n 144 and text. See also the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Attheraces 
Ltd v British Horseracing Board [2007] EWCA Civ 38. 
71
  For example, three main conceptual challenges suggesting a cautionary approach to excessive 
pricing cases arguably are that the markets are self-correcting, the prohibition is tantamount to 
prohibiting the dominant position and that exploitative practices serve an important dynamic role, 
thereby increasing welfare, see M Gal, “Abuse of Dominance-exploitative abuses” in I Lioanos 
and D Geradin (eds) Handbook on European Competition Law: Substantive Aspects (Edward 
Elgar, 2013). 
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“practices that cause consumers harm through their impact on competition”.72 Indeed, 
arguably the concern about the conduct at issue in Huawei is not only that hold-up 
may allow SEP holders to secure rewards for innovation beyond their true value to 
consumers, but also that if the SEP holder is able to hold-up implementers post-
standardisation, confidence in, and the working of, the standard-setting will be 
undermined, open and effective access to the standard will be precluded and 
competition may be  distorted through the exclusion, elimination or hampering of 
competition, new entry and innovation downstream. This will create upward pricing 
pressure and prevent the development of the secondary market to the detriment of 
consumers.
73
 As in the case of a refusal to deal or margin squeeze, therefore, a core 
antitrust concern is that the seeking of an injunction may distort competition in 
downstream markets.  
(b)  Identifying unlawful exclusionary conduct? 
i.  Distinguishing competition on the basis of performance from unlawful 
exclusionary conduct 
A majority of EU jurisprudence focuses on exclusionary conduct which “through 
recourse to methods different from that which condition normal competition in 
products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the 
effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the 
market or the growth of that competition”.74 The case-law thus draws a vital 
distinction between competition on the basis of performance, or competition on the 
merits, and abusive exclusionary conduct. As the line between such conduct is 
notoriously difficult to draw, especially as it frequently looks alike, the challenge  for 
any competition law system is to construct legal rules or standards to identify 
exclusionary abusive behaviour and to distinguish it from competition in a way which 
provides sufficient (i) clarity and (ii) accuracy – so avoiding both Type 1 
(condemning legitimate aggressive competition and so potentially chilling pro-
competitive conduct) and/or Type 2 errors (allowing anti-competitive practices to 
escape antitrust prohibitions). The tendency in the EU has been for the distinction to 
be drawn through the use of conduct-specific tests. Nonetheless, principles are 
emerging from the cases which are helpful to understand the concept of an abuse, how 
it might apply in cases where novel allegations of abuse are raised, and in seeking to 
 
72
  Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet 27 March 2012, ¶ 20. 
73
  See supra nn 22-23 and text. The purpose of the FRAND obligation was also to preclude the SEP-
holder from engaging in exclusionary behaviour at the standard-setting stage, by taking away 
incentives to exclude competing technology from the standard. In the absence of the FRAND 
obligation, a competing technology may have been chosen. If it can be demonstrated that the 
practice has an exclusionary effect, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the licensing demand 
would constitute “excessive” pricing for the purposes of Article 102(a). In margin squeeze cases 
for example, it is not necessary to establish that the price upstream constitutes excessive, 
exploitative conduct: the question is whether the pricing as a whole will result in anti-competitive 
effects downstream, see eg, Körber, supra n 43, 229-230. See also Case T-201/04 Microsoft, supra 
n 78, ¶¶643-653.  
74
  Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461, ¶ 91. 
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ensure that Article 102 is not applied formalistically, but in a coherent and consistent 
manner which treats economically-equivalent actions in an identical manner.  
In the context of pricing abuses, for example, the concept of the “equally efficient 
competitor”75 is developing as an important mechanism for distinguishing unlawful 
pricing practices from hard-nosed price competition. Pricing practices which have an 
exclusionary effect on equally efficient competitors of a dominant firm will generally 
be condemned as abusive where anti-competitive effects,
76
 actual, potential or likely, 
can be demonstrated.  
Further, and of particular relevance to the questions raised in Huawei, are the 
principles established in cases which have considered whether, and if so when, Article 
102 may operate to constrain the exercise of an IPR-holders exclusive rights. These 
cases establish that, although Article 102 generally does not preclude an IPR holder 
from relying on the substance of its right, so that reliance on such rights cannot in 
itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position,
77
 it may do so in exceptional 
circumstances.
78
 For example, it is established that a refusal to license (and a 
“constructive” refusal to license (“the imposition of unreasonable conditions in return 
for the supply”79))  may constitute an abuse of a dominant position where: separate 
upstream and downstream markets are identified; the IPR involved is “indispensable” 
for the rival to compete downstream (there are no actual or potential substitutes for it); 
the refusal is likely to eliminate all effective competition on the secondary market 
(even if not imminent); the party seeking the licence wishes to offer a new product, 
not duplicating that offered by the dominant firm, for which there is a consumer 
demand or that the refusal to license will prevent the development of the secondary 
market to the detriment of consumers, through damaging innovation or the 
improvement or variety of products downstream; and there is no objective 
justification for the refusal.
80
 Where such exceptional circumstances exist it becomes 
 
75
  See, eg, Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR I-03359 and Case C-280/08P Deutsche 
Telekom v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555. 
76
  See especially, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, supra n 72, Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v 
TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR-I 527 and infra nn 110-115and accompany text. 
77
  Cases C-241–242/91 P RTE & ITP v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, ¶ 49. See also Case 53/87 
CICCRA v Renault [1988] ECR 6039 (The ECJ stressed that a refusal by a car manufacturer to 
license did not necessarily constitute an abuse (rather the right of the IPR holder to make exclusive 
use of the right is the substance of the exclusive right), but would do so if it gave rise to “certain 
abusive conduct . . . such as the arbitrary refusal to deliver spare parts to independent repairers”, ¶ 
16 and Case 238/87 Volvo v Veng, supra n 69. 
78
  See especially Cases C-241-242/91P RTE & ITP ibid, Case 7/97 Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint 
Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG [1998] ECR I-7791, Case T-201/04 Microsoft 
v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601. 
79
  Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
[now Article 102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (Guidance 
Paper) [2009] OJ C45/2, ¶ 79, see also eg, Case 34174 Sealink/B&I – Holyhead (Interim 
Measures) 11 June 1992. The Commission also treats margin squeeze analogously with refusal to 
deal in its Guidance Paper. 
80
  The EU courts have been willing to assume that such conduct will harm the competitive structure 
and, possibly, consumers through the elimination or rivals on the downstream market. 
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permissible “in the public interest in maintaining effective competition on the market, 
to encroach upon the exclusive right of the holder of the intellectual property right by 
requiring him to grant licences to third parties seeking to enter or remain on the 
market.”81 
One possibility
82
 is either to treat the seeking of an injunction as a form of refusal to 
license
83
 in circumstances where, if the injunction were granted, the subsequent 
refusal, or constructive refusal, to licence would constitute an abuse
84
 or to analyse the 
legal treatment of the conduct as a type of pricing abuse (because it impacts on the 
level or royalties that are ultimately paid).
85
 Alternatively, as the seeking of an 
injunction does not seem to fall squarely within either of these categories of abuse, it 
might be preferable to rely on these lines of cases more generally as indicating that 
when identifying an abuse the EU courts look for evidence: (i) of whether the conduct 
at issue falls within the scope of competition on the merits; and, where it does not; (ii) 
of whether anticompetitive effects, actual or potential, can be demonstrated. Indeed, 
this approach was adopted in AstraZeneca (AZ)
86
 when it had to be determined 
whether specific conduct relating to misuse of the patent system, not previously 
considered in EU jurisprudence, violated Article 102. In this case the ECJ stressed 
that Article 102 prohibits dominant firms from eliminating competition by “utilising 
methods other than those which come within the scope of competition on the 
merits.”87 It then went on to find that having recourse to highly misleading 
 
81
  Microsoft, supra n 78, ¶ 691. 
82
  For an analysis of some possible tests that can be used to identify an abuse under Article 102, see 
Petit, supra n 33. 
83
  For the view that the analysis required by treating the seeking of an injunction as a refusal to 
license is similar to the analysis conducted by the US courts when determining whether or not it 
should exercise its discretion to grant an injunction to a SEP-holder, see Körber, supra n 43, 225 
84
  In the standard-setting context, a FRAND-encumbered SEP will frequently be an essential input 
for implementers who need to comply with the standard to compete on the downstream market so 
that a refusal to licence will eliminate and prevent the development of the secondary market to the 
detriment of consumers. Further, an obligation to licence will not adversely impact on innovation 
and incentives to invest by the patent holder or implementer, as otherwise the FRAND 
commitment would not have been required and/or agreed to in the first place, see further infra n 
107 and text). An important issue however is whether the seeking of an injunction can be 
characterised as a refusal, or a “constructive”, refusal to license. In FRAND cases there is not 
ordinarily an “unconditional” refusal to license designed to reserve the downstream product market 
to the dominant IPR-holder upstream – on the contrary, the SEP holder has committed to grant the 
licence and the injunction action is launched in the context of the negotiations and bargaining 
process between it and the infringing entity/ potential licensee as to the determination of FRAND 
term. If, however, the SEP-holder launches the proceedings against a willing licensee (see further 
infra n 97 and text) arguably that could be treated as tantamount to a refusal to deal. 
85
  Unlike in margin squeeze cases, it is hard to demonstrate that the unreasonable royalty demand by 
a single SEP-holder will exclude an equally efficient competitor downstream: the harm 
downstream is liable to result from the cumulative effect of unreasonable demands by all SEP-
holders and not from the pricing conduct of the dominant firm alone, see supra B.1. See also 
discussion of Case T-111/96, ITT Promedia NV v Commission [1998] ECR II-2937, infra section 
D.2.e. 
86
  Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v. Commission 6 December 2012. 
87
  Ibid, ¶ 75. 
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representations with the aim of leading public authorities into error (for the purposes 
of improperly obtaining exclusive rights) was “manifestly not consistent with 
competition on the merits and the specific responsibility on such an undertaking not to 
prejudice, by its conduct, effective and undistorted competition”.88 Nonetheless, the 
ECJ accepted that this was not sufficient to constitute an abuse in itself. Rather, an 
anti-competitive effect on the market was required; although “such an effect does not 
necessarily have to be concrete, and it is sufficient to demonstrate that there is a 
potential anti-competitive effect (see to that effect, TeliaSonera Sverige, paragraph 
64).”89 The ECJ also confirmed that AZ’s act of deregistering market authorisation for 
Losec capsules was not, even if AZ was entitled to request its withdrawal, based on 
the legitimate protection of an investment which comes within the scope of 
competition on the merits;
90
 “an undertaking which holds a dominant position has a 
special responsibility … it cannot therefore use regulatory procedures in such a way 
as to prevent or make more difficult the entry of competitors on the market, in the 
absence of grounds relating to the defence of the legitimate interests of an undertaking 
engaged in competition on the merits or in the absence of objective justification.”91 
The ECJ thus stressed that the illegality of the conduct is unrelated to its compliance 
or non-compliance with legal rules and that a dominant undertaking may commit an 
abuse even when it is exercising legal rights. 
ii.  Relying on a FRAND-encumbered SEP to obtain an injunction: competition 
on the merits or unlawful exclusionary conduct? 
Competition on the Merits? 
The question to be decided in SEP cases is whether “exceptional circumstances”, 
within the meaning of the case law, exist which mean that it is legitimate for 
competition law to encroach on the exclusive rights of the SEP-holder; or whether the 
seeking of an injunction against an implementer infringing the SEP (the normal 
prerogative of the IP owner) is based on the legitimate protection of an investment 
which comes within the scope of competition on the merits.  
The distinctive features of these types of case are that: (i) the SEP-holder is not an 
ordinary patent holder but has voluntarily committed to forgo some of its patent rights 
– in particular, the right to decide whether or not to licence its SEPs and the unfettered 
right to decide on the terms of the licence – in return for having its technology 
incorporated in the standard;
92
 and (ii) this commitment was required to ensure that 
the standard setting process was compatible with the competition law rules, in 
particular by preventing the risk of harm to competition from hold-up. Where, 
therefore, an assessment is made which suggests that the SEP-holder is seeking an 
injunction not to protect its investment but in circumstances which are liable to result 
 
88
  Ibid, ¶ 98 
89
  Ibid, ¶ 112. See also infra n 110. 
90
  Ibid, para 31. 
91
  Ibid, para 134. 
92
  See supra Section A.2. 
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in hold-up, contrary to the objective of the FRAND commitment it has voluntarily 
given, it would appear that “exceptional circumstances” do exist; the conduct is not 
consistent with competition on the merits and the specific responsibility of the 
dominant firm (in these circumstances pledged) not to prejudice effective and 
undistorted competition. The crucial question which then follows is whether the 
simple seeking of an injunction by a FRAND-encumbered SEP-holder can be said to 
create a risk of hold-up or whether something further is required.  
One answer might be that nothing more is ordinarily required; it is not, save in special 
circumstances, legitimate for FRAND-encumbered SEP-holders to bring actions for 
injunctions as their general availability will tip the balance of power in negotiations 
towards excessive royalties and hold-up. Implementers locked-in to the standard, and 
facing the prospect of severe loss as a result of being excluded from the downstream 
market following the grant of an injunction, will be forced to agree to non-FRAND 
terms.
93
 Indeed, as Motorola’s expert witness itself admitted in the course of 
Motorola’s litigation against Microsoft before the Mannheim court, a single patent 
essential to an industry standard is as valuable as a large number of patents on the 
same standard because, “it only takes one bullet to kill”.94 The SEP-holder should, 
therefore, be treated as having irrevocably waived its general right to refuse a license 
to an implementer and, consequently, be barred from seeking a cease and desist order 
against an entity who infringes its SEP. Both the seeking and the award and 
enforcement of an injunction is unjustified as the non-infringement counterfactual is 
not (as with ordinary patents) the right to refuse a licence, but only a FRAND licence.  
Consequently, the SEP-holder should be treated as having committed itself to relying 
solely on a remedy of seeking a reasonable royalty against any infringer;
95
 the 
FRAND commitment “implicitly acknowledges that a [FRAND] royalty is adequate 
compensation for a license to use that patent”.96 Special circumstances in which an 
injunction might be justifiable, however, could be where an infringing implementer:  
(i) is not a “willing licensee”: an unwillingness to pay FRAND terms on the part 
of the implementer cannot, however, be assumed simply from the fact of 
 
93
  See especially supra nn 68 and 69 and Kattan and Wood, supra n 19 (“An increasing number of 
reported cases indicate that these threats are real and provide empirical evidence refuting claims 
that hold-up is inconsequential or theoretical”). 
94
  This admission expressly acknowledges that the value of the FRAND-pledged patent results from 
its ability to “kill” others with it – “the very opposite of what FRAND-pledged standards-essential 
patents should be used for”, see “Motorola likens its enforcement of FRAND patents to bank 
robbery: ‘it only takes one bullet to kill’” http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/02/motorola-likens-its-
enforcement-of.html accessed on 24 December 2013. 
95
  See eg, Farrell et al, supra n 20; M Lemley, “Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organisations” (2002) 90 California Law Review 1889; J Miller, “Standard-Setting, Patents and 
Access Lock-in: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm” (2007) 40 Indiana Law Review 
351; Hesse, supra n 22; Kanter, supra n 60. For the view that injunctions generally undermine the 
FRAND regime and so should not be available save in the most exceptional circumstances, see eg 
the views of D Carlton and C Shapiro in “Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust 
Issues” (2013) 27(3) Antitrust 10, 12 and Carlton & Shampine, supra n 14. 
96
  Judge Posner, Apple Inc v Motorola Inc. 869 F Supp 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill 2012). 
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infringement in standards cases.
97
 Rather, both parties should be required to 
negotiate in good faith and implementer should be considered to be willing 
unless it has refused to accept a licence on agreed, or independently 
determined FRAND terms (by a court or arbitral tribunal); or  
(ii) is insolvent and unable to pay the royalty. 
Another answer, however, could be that such an inflexible rule is unwarranted and 
that something further than simply seeking an injunction is required, especially as 
there is little evidence that hold-up occurs or is preventing investment in, and the 
success of standards. Those supporting such a view might argue that even SEP-
holders must be able to exercise their essential right to protect the exclusive nature of 
their patent through an injunction against an infringer of that right – and that this is 
the reason why SSO rules do not explicitly prohibit the seeking of an injunction. 
Otherwise SEP-holders will not be able to counteract the conduct of an implementer 
who operates on the market without a licence, so infringing the patent, and who holds-
out by refusing to bargain in good-faith (identified by some commentators as the 
“reverse hold-up” problem). It has thus been argued that “[d]enying access to 
injunctions for SEP-holders in (effectively) all circumstances would give prospective 
licensees enhanced ability and incentives to free ride on SEPs”98 and would force the 
patentees to enter costly litigation dealing with validity, essentiality and infringement 
in order to compel the implementer to take a licence to what might be a multitude of 
valid SEPs.
99
 Seeking an injunction should thus be seen as “an option in the context of 
procedures that balances the incentives of both SEP-holder and prospective licensee” 
and an integral part of a multi-dynamic game played to achieve the balance between 
the negotiating parties - balancing the potential for hold-up by the SEP-holder with 
potentially opportunist behaviour by the prospective licensee.
100
 This balancing can be 
conducted by courts on a case-by-case basis as they normally do when determining 
whether an injunction should be granted. A FRAND pledge should not therefore be 
taken to imply a “waiver of seeking injunctive relief”101 nor should a decision “to seek 
 
97
  The reality is that FRAND licences are not generally negotiated in advance (even if they should 
be) and there are a number of practical reasons for this, see eg, JL Contreras, “Fixing FRAND: A 
Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing” (2013) 79(1) Antitrust Law Journal 
47, 59-62. 
98
  Camesasca et al, supra n 100, 289. 
99
  JD Harkrider, “Seeing the Forest Through the SEPs” (2013) 27(3) Antitrust 22, 26 (“If firms are 
free to refuse to pay for their use of SEPS without any risk of injunctions or damages that might 
lead to underinvestment in standards development and related innovation”). For a discussion of the 
marginal costs and benefits of applying US antitrust law to the "so-called patent holdup problem" 
see eg BH Kobayashi and JD Wright, "Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on 
Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup" (2009) 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 
469, GS Cary, MW Nelson, SJ Kaiser and AR Sistla, "The Case for Antitrust Law to Policy the 
Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting" (2011) 77 Antitrust LJ 913 and H Kobayashi and JD 
Wright, "The Limits of Antitrust and Patent Holdup: A Reply to Cary et al" (2013) 78 Antitrust LJ 
505. 
100
  P Camesasca, G Langus, D Neven and P Treacy, “Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents: 
Justice is not Blind” (2013) 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 285, 287 (hold-out (or 
reverse hold-up) is as valid a concern as hold-up when considering the impact of the conduct on 
innovation and downstream competition). 
101
  Ratliff and Rubinfeld, supra n 23, 9. 
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an injunction … be seen mechanically as a refusal to license”. Rather, it might be an 
“efficient and necessary tool” to compel recalcitrant implementers to engage in good-
faith licensing negotiations and to ensure that innovators continue to participate in 
standard setting processes.
102
  
For the purposes of EU competition law, it is proposed that an approach closer to the 
first is preferable; the seeking an injunction in cases involving FRAND-encumbered 
patents should not be considered to constitute competition on the merits unless the 
patentee can demonstrate that it was acting in defence of its legitimate interests, to 
protect its investment, and so has a justification for the conduct, for example, that the 
implementer is not a “willing licensee” (as defined above)103 or is unable to pay. Such 
a rule would preclude anticompetitive reliance on patent rights and avoid the risk of 
Type 2 errors without creating an excessive risk of Type 1 errors. 
First, if SEP-holders have an unchecked right to seek (and subsequently enforce) an 
injunction the risk of hold-up and Type 2 errors appears severe. It has been seen in 
section C that the reality is that implementers faced with injunction actions in 
Germany have had the choice of either suffering significant harm as a result of being 
excluded from a major fast-moving market or paying the rate demanded by the 
patentee for past infringements and future licence payments (however unreasonable 
that may appear) and waiving all validity and essentiality claims (and even though a 
large number of patents turn out to be invalid when actually tested).
104
 The judgments 
of the lower courts in Germany make it very difficult for potential licensees to resist 
an injunction in practice, even if they are willing to engage in good-faith licence 
negotiations. It is over-optimistic therefore to assume that national injunction 
procedures permit implementers to raise FRAND and other technical defences so that 
there is no need for an antitrust limitation on seeking injunctions.
105
 Further, it is not 
correct that recognizing an injunction as an option will not “necessarily subject 
implementers to hold-up, since they would always retain the right to seek a FRAND 
licen[c]e and to seek judicial relief if they believe the licensor is breaching its 
 
102
  Ibid, 24. 
103
  The purpose of the FRAND promise is to encourage use of the standard: the SEP-holder has 
promised to license to implementers who may not be able to negotiate licences in advance of 
implementing the standard. Implementers should therefore be a willing licensee so long as they 
have declared a willingness to adhere to FRAND licensing terms and to pay court or tribunal 
adjudicated rates if agreement cannot be reached, see supra n 97 and text.  
104
  Google/Motorola, supra n 28, ¶107 (“it may be that the threat of injunction, the seeking of an 
injunction or indeed the actual enforcement of an injunction granted against a good faith potential 
licensee, may significantly impede effective competition by, for example, forcing the potential 
licensee into agreeing to potentially onerous licensing terms which it would otherwise not have 
agreed to. These onerous terms may include, for example, a higher royalty than would otherwise 
have been agreed. To the extent that injunctions are actually enforced, this furthermore may have a 
direct negative effect on consumers if products are excluded from the market. Even if exclusion of 
competing products from the market through injunctions were to be temporary (i.e. there would be 
a delay only in access to the relevant products until the counter-party of the SEP-holder agreed to 
the commercial terms demanded), in a fast-moving market such as the smart mobile device market, 
serious harm could potentially be caused by it”). 
105
  Camesasca et al, supra n 100, 306. 
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commitment”.106 On the contrary, EU experience is that even implementers willing to 
license on court-certified FRAND terms have been unable to avoid injunctions in 
Germany. 
Secondly, it can be assumed that a denial of the right to seek an injunction against 
willing licensees (and an obligation to licence) will not adversely impact on freedom 
to contract or innovation and incentives to invest by either the patent holder or 
implementer (where it is locked-in to, and unable to design around, the standard); the 
existence of the FRAND commitment makes it clear that the SEP-holder will not be 
irreparably harmed since it “planned to monetize its IP through broad licensing on 
reasonable terms rather than though exclusive use”.107  
Thirdly, the removal of an unfettered right to seek an injunction does not 
automatically create a risk of Type 1 errors and mean that implementers are free to 
infringe SEPs with impunity and hold-out against patentees. If the parties cannot 
agree on FRAND terms, having reached an “impasse”, the patentee may request a 
court (or arbiter) to order the infringer to pay damages in respect of past infringement 
and/or to pay an ongoing royalty for future licensed use.
108
 In section E it is 
recognised that much more needs to be done to ensure that disputes in relation to 
FRAND terms are settled more efficiently to the mutual benefit and satisfaction of 
both parties to the dispute. If the implementer has been behaving unreasonably by 
refusing to negotiate in good faith or in a timely way, the patentee will be able to 
recover its costs.
109
 If a potential licensee continues to behave unreasonably and 
refuses to pay FRAND terms as independently determined by a tribunal or court, this 
could be raised by the SEP-holder as a basis for arguing that seeking an injunction 
against such a licensee is justifiable on the facts (see also the discussion of objective 
justification below).  
Anti-competitive effects 
It also appears arguable that where an injunction is sought in circumstances which 
would allow hold-up, anticompetitive effects “which may potentially exclude 
 
106
  Harkrider, supra n 99, 24. 
107
  FTC, opinion towards the Independent Trade Commission (2012), 6.6 and supra n 96. In addition, 
in standards cases the dominance of the patent is not necessarily achieved because of the 
superiority of the technology but may result from the incorporation of the technology within the 
standard.  
108
  Microsoft v Motorola (WD Wash, 29 November 2012), footnote 9 (“The court is unconvinced by 
Motorola’s argument that it has or will suffer irreparable harm to its goodwill and reputation 
because a compulsory license agreement would encourage others to infringe Motorola’s standard 
essential patents. This is not the case, The court’s prior rulings have made clear that Microsoft, as 
an implementer […,] must accept a RAND license […] As the court has explained in the situation 
where a standard essential patent holder and an implementer reach an impasse during negotiations 
for a RAND license, the courthouse may be the only forum to adjudicate the rights of the patentee 
and the third-party beneficiary of the RAND commitments. Certainly, easily measurable litigation 
costs to enforce one’s rights cannot constitute irreparable harm”). 
109
  See Directive 2004/48/EC, supra n 30, especially Arts 9, 13 and 14 (the latter provides that the 
reasonable and proportionate legal costs and expenses of the successful party should generally be 
borne by the unsuccessful party). 
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competitors”110 and eliminate effective competition may be demonstrable;111 if an 
injunction is granted open access to, and the success of, the standard will not be 
achieved as, if compliance with the standard is mandatory, implementers will be 
excluded from the downstream market. Further, even if the enforcement of the 
injunction is avoided through the negotiation of terms which the implementer would 
not otherwise have accepted,
112
 hold-up occurs and there is a risk that confidence in 
the standard setting process will be undermined and the ability of the implementer to 
compete in the downstream market will be impeded or, in some circumstances, even 
eliminated.  
Both the ECJ and the Commission have recognised the importance of acting rapidly 
under Article 102 in growing markets, before the anticompetitive effects of the 
strategy can be realised.
113
 As even temporary exclusion from fast moving technology 
markets can cause serious harm,
114
 the ECJ has held that Article 102 does not apply 
“only from the time when there is no more, or practically no more, competition on the 
market. If the Commission were required to wait until competitors were eliminated 
from the market, or until their elimination was sufficiently imminent, before being 
able to take action under [Article 102] that would clearly run counter to the objective 
of the provision, which is to maintain undistorted competition in the common market 
and, in particular, to safeguard the competition that still exists on the relevant 
market.”115  
 
110
  Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera, supra  n 76, ¶ 64. EU law therefore does not require proof of actual 
anticompetitive effects or a high probability that such effects will arise. Rather, to ensure that the 
evidentiary burden on claimants is not placed too high, the test appears to require it to be 
demonstrated that “in a manner tailored to the specificities and facts of each case, that a particular 
practice ‘tends’ to restrict competition in the sense that it has the potential to hinder competition. It 
must thus be demonstrated that it is plausible that the practice harms or will harm competition. 
Abstract, purely hypothetical or remote assertions or theories of harm, which are not linked to the 
specificities of the case at hand, will thus not suffice,” AstraZeneca, supra n 86, Opinion of Mazák 
AG, paras 62-63. 
111
  Cases of exclusionary abuse ordinarily involve a scenario in which a dominant firm engages in 
conduct designed to foreclose competition from the dominated or a neighbouring or downstream 
market; indeed the Commission has stated that it focuses its enforcement efforts under Article 102 
on abusive conduct which is likely to lead to “anti-competitive foreclosure” of competitors to the 
detriment of consumers, Guidance Paper, supra n 79, ¶¶ 19-20. In many of the injunction cases 
that have arisen in the EU, the SEP-holder has operated in the downstream market as an 
implementer in competition with other smartphone manufacturers. This factor may facilitate a 
finding of anticompetitive effects as, arguably, a vertically integrated entity has an incentive to 
engage in conduct which creates barriers to competition in the downstream market. Where 
however the SEP is owned by a PAE, or another undertaking which does not operate in the 
downstream market, such an incentive does not exist; in these cases therefore it may be more of a 
challenge to demonstrate anticompetitive effects. Nonetheless, even if the SEP-holder is not 
vertically integrated, the ability to exploit market power post-standardisation and hold-up 
implementers seems also to give rise to a possibility of potential anti-competitive effects through a 
distortion of competition downstream. 
112
  See supra n 68 and accompanying text 
113
  Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera,  supra n 76, ¶ 108. 
114
  Google/Motorola, supra n 28, ¶107. 
115
  Case T-201/04 Microsoft, supra n 78, ¶ 561. 
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(c)  Objective Justification 
Although not set out in the wording of Article 102, the EU Courts have consistently 
held that a dominant undertaking may provide objective justification for behaviour 
that is otherwise liable to be caught by the prohibition under Article 102. Broadly,  
dominant firms may do this either by showing that their conduct is objectively 
necessary or that the abusive conduct is counterbalanced by objective economic 
justifications - advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit consumers.
116
 A 
SEP-holder could therefore seek to justify the seeking of an injunction either (i) on 
technical or commercial grounds,
117
 for example, where the implementer has refused 
to comply with an independently adjudicated FRAND determination (it is not a 
“willing licensee”118) or is unable to pay, or (ii) on the basis of efficiencies, although 
it would not seem to be open to a SEP-holder to argue that the injunction is required 
to safeguard innovation and incentives to invest
119
 or to encourage implementers to 
accept its licensing terms.  
(d)  Conduct authorised at the national level 
It would be no defence to a finding of an abuse of dominance that the conduct was 
permitted or authorised under national law (for example, because the national rules 
permitted the seeking and the award of an injunction). Article 102 applies to conduct 
attributable to an undertaking on its own initiative – such as the voluntary seeking of 
an injunction - and will only not apply if the anticompetitive conduct is required of the 
undertaking by national legislation or if national legislation creates a legal framework 
which eliminates any possibility of competitive activity.
120
 Where national legislation 
leaves open the possibility for competition, a dominant firm has a special 
responsibility not to obstruct it and to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition. 
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(e)  Access to court? 
In ITT Promedia NV v Commission
121
 the General Court stressed the importance of 
the principle of access to Court both as a fundamental right and a general principle 
ensuring the rule of law. Consequently, it endorsed the Commission’s view that 
Article 102 could only deny the right to bring legal proceedings exceptionally where 
(i) the legal action cannot reasonably be considered as an attempt to establish the 
rights of the undertaking concerned and can therefore only serve to harass the 
opposite party; and (ii) the action is conceived in the framework of a plan whose goal 
is to eliminate competition.  
An important difference to ordinary cases of patent litigation, however, is, as has 
already been stressed, the fact that the SEP holder has given a FRAND commitment – 
implying that it will grant licences and will not seek injunctions against licensees who 
have accepted to agree FRAND licensing terms. In this context, an acceptance that the 
seeking of an injunction by a patent-holder may, in the exceptional circumstances of 
the case, constitute an abuse of a dominant position, does not seem to deny the patent-
holder access to court or the right to bring legal proceedings. On the contrary, it 
simply demands (i) that the SEP-holder seek other remedies to safeguard its patent 
rights in the legal proceedings (such as damages for past infringement and the 
determination of future FRAND licensing terms) where the infringer is a “willing 
licensee”; and, if the SEP-holder does seek an injunction, that (ii) the national court 
consider whether the seeking of any injunction, and its enforcement, would constitute 
an abuse and, where it does, set aside any national rules which would permit the 
award of the injunction. National courts have an obligation to set-aside national rules 
which authorise conduct prohibited by EU law and must not apply national rules 
which make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise EU rights - the 
principle of effectiveness.
122
 
Indeed, the case of ITT-Promedia has not operated to preclude previous findings that, 
in exceptional circumstances, an IPR-holder’s refusal to license constitutes an abuse 
of a dominant position, even though such a holding inherently precludes the IPR 
holder from exercising its exclusive right over the IPR and protecting it through the 
seeking of an injunction.
123
 Similarly, it should not preclude a finding that in 
exceptional circumstances the seeking of an injunction does not constitute a legitimate 
exercise of IPR but constitutes unlawful abusive conduct.  
Further, it is arguable that, conversely, recognising that a SEP-holder has a right to 
seek an injunction might have the effect of denying the implementer access to the 
court if, as in Germany it is obliged, in order to avoid the injunction, to give up its 
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right to make bona-fide challenges to the validity and/or infringement of the patent 
and/or the licensing terms. 
E.  CONCLUSIONS AND DETERMINING ARTICLE 102 AND FRAND-
COMPATIBLE LICENSING TERMS 
FRAND commitments are required to ensure that the public benefit of standard 
setting is not undermined by private profit-maximising of individual SEP-holders. 
There now seems to be a fairly broad-consensus in both the US and EU amongst 
antitrust enforcement authorities and courts that “SEP-holders should abide by their 
F/RAND commitments and refrain from obtaining injunctive relief against willing 
licensees.”124 The ECJ has the opportunity in Huawei to clarify whether EU 
competition law supports this consensus and, if so, precisely when the seeking of an 
injunction violates Article 102.  
The discussion in section D indicates that as the seeking of an injunction may enable 
SEP-holders in the EU to hold-up implementers willing to pay FRAND royalties and 
to extract unreasonable royalty terms from them in a manner which threatens 
competition, such conduct may be abusive where the threat of hold-up is real. Not 
only might the seeking of an injunction permit the extraction of “unfair” or 
“discriminatory” licensing terms, but it may compromise the success of the standard 
setting process and result in anticompetitive effects in the downstream market and, 
consequently, harm to consumers. Where anticompetitive effects are demonstrable, 
this paper proposes that the seeking of an injunction by a FRAND-encumbered SEP-
holder should be found to be abusive unless the patentee can demonstrate that the 
injunction application is justified, for example, because the implementer has refused 
to accept a licence on agreed, or independently determined FRAND terms (by a court 
or arbitral tribunal) or is unable to pay. Such a conclusion will achieve harmonisation 
of approach across the EU and will not adversely impact on innovation in technology 
upstream as long as mechanisms are in place to ensure that SEP-holders can receive 
royalty rates in respect of past-infringements (together with interest) and in the future 
which are compatible with Article 102 and the FRAND commitment.  
Pressing questions, consequently, are how can “fair”, “reasonable”125 and “non-
discriminatory” terms be assessed and, in particular, how do these concepts correlate 
to the principles established in Article 102 cases dealing with the question of whether 
a dominant firm has imposed unfair selling prices or engaged in prohibited price 
discrimination? If greater clarity is provided on this matter, the number of disputes 
will be likely to fall. If clarity is not enhanced, there is risk both that the costs from 
hold-up and royalty stacking will continue and increase, especially “if more patent 
owners choose to monetize their patent rights”126 and that innovation and contribution 
to standards will be deterred if patentees are not able to ensure that those utilising 
them are held to account.   
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Although there is currently no specific EU judicial precedent dealing with the 
question of precisely what FRAND means and how FRAND licensing royalties can 
be calculated, a case is being heard in the Mannheim District Court in Germany in 
which the court is expected to set a rate for a Motorola SEP portfolio relating to 
wireless telecommunications technology.
127
 These proceedings have, however, been 
stayed as the court has sought guidance from the Commission on the correct approach 
to assessing the value of a SEP portfolio and setting a FRAND rate.
128
 Crucial issues 
to be determined are likely to include: 
(i) how the value of the technology is to be assessed and, in particular, whether it 
should be based on the value of the IPR before or after the standardisation took 
place; 
(ii) what the appropriate base for setting the royalty is; for example, whether it should 
be based on the price of the individual component incorporating the standard or 
the price of the end product into which the technology is incorporated; 
(iii)how to address the royalty stacking problem and concern that cumulative royalties 
for the standard may exceed the value of the end product or otherwise risk making 
downstream businesses unviable for manufacturers. 
Competition agencies have to date generally, and understandably, been unwilling to 
get drawn into answering these questions.
129
 Rather, there is a view
130
 that SSOs 
should be doing more to tighten contractual provisions and processes, in particular 
through clarifying the meaning of FRAND commitments,
131
 who they bind, and by 
including a process which the parties must follow to ensure that disputes relating to 
patent licensing are resolved – using negotiation and, if necessary, courts or 
arbitration procedures - prior to an injunction being sought. SSOs might also consider 
whether greater use of patent pooling
132
 or joint ex ante negotiations of licensing 
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terms
133
 might present a solution in some situations. As SSOs are likely to find it hard 
to meet these demands, it seems inevitable that both competition agencies and courts 
will have to provide answers to the issues raised and the question of when the rates 
will be compatible with competition law. Indeed, some themes and possible answers 
to the questions posed above are beginning to emerge, both from some recent high 
profile cases in the US
134
 and from previous EU jurisprudence and guidance.
135
 These 
developments indicate that the Commission might, when answering the questions 
posed by the Mannheim District Court, take the view that the value of the technology 
should be assessed on the value of the technology prior to standardisation, that the 
appropriate royalty base for a FRAND royalty should bear the closest possible 
relationship to the standardized functionality rather than the end product price and that 
there should be a maximum cumulative royalty established in order to address 
“royalty stacking” concerns. 
First, the Commission’s horizontal co-operation guidelines suggest that a FRAND 
royalty should relate to the requirement in Article 102 that a dominant firm should not 
charge a price which is excessive; that is, one which has no reasonable relation to the 
economic value
136
 of the IPRs.  
“The questions … to be determined are whether the difference between the 
costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is excessive, and, if the 
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answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether a price has been imposed 
which is either unfair in itself or when compared to competing products”.137  
The problems involved in determining costs and establishing a suitable comparison 
are well-known. In the SEP context, the Commission takes that view that cost-base 
methods are not appropriate because of the difficulty of assessing the costs 
attributable to the development of a particular patent or group of patents. It thus 
proposes a non-exhaustive list of methods that may in certain circumstances be 
feasible to make the required assessment. For example that: a comparison be made 
between the licensing fees charged by the SEP-holder in question in a competitive 
environment before the industry was locked in to the standard and those charged after 
the industry has been locked in;
138
 an independent expert assessment is obtained of the 
objective centrality and essentiality to the standard of the relevant IPR portfolio; 
reference is made to ex ante disclosure of licensing terms in the context of a specific 
standard-setting process; or royalty rates are compared with those charged for the 
same IPR in other comparable standards.
139
 This approach seems to accord with a 
fairly wide acceptance that the requirement that royalties be fair and reasonable 
requires them to be based on that which the patent holder could have obtained in 
open, up-front competition with other technologies - linking reasonable return to the 
ex ante value of the patented technology and with the objective of enhancing the 
value, and facilitating the use of, the standard.
140
 Although there is some support for 
the opposite view, that the patent holder should be able to extract royalties based on 
the ex-post-value reflecting the increase in market power following standardisation, 
after participants are effectively locked in to use technology covered by the patent, it 
is unclear how such an approach is consistent with the objective of the FRAND 
commitment and Article 102 TFEU; that SEP holders should not be able to exploit 
and abuse the market power that arises from inclusion in a standard.  
Secondly, in relation to the appropriate royalty base, it has not been clarified whether 
the non-discrimination requirement of FRAND demands literally no discrimination on 
royalty rates or licensing terms between similarly situated licensees.
141
 The royalties 
agreed by Rambus in the commitments decision, however, were based on the price of 
an individually sold chip rather than the price of any end product into which the chip 
was incorporated.
142
 In the US, Judge Holderman in assessing the FRAND base in 
Innovatio also concluded that the appropriate royalty base was the WiFi chip and not 
the end product since Innovatio failed to “credibly apportion the value of the end 
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products down to the patented features”.143 The Competition Commission of India, 
which is currently in the process of investigating Ericsson’s conduct, has also set out 
its preliminary view that Ericsson’s practice of charging a royalty based on the value 
of the end product produced by the implementer is excessive, discriminatory and 
contrary to FRAND terms.
144
 
Thirdly, in the US judges have been mindful of the need to ensure that there is a 
maximum cumulative royalty for the standard as a whole to avoid the risk that 
downstream innovators are priced out of the market by unreasonable cumulative 
royalty demands. In the Microsoft v Motorola case in the US, for example, the court 
expressed concern that Motorola’s request was inconsistent with FRAND given that, 
if its demands were acceded to, “the aggregate royalty to implement the 802.11 
Standard, which is only one feature of the Xbox product, would exceed the total 
product price”. The court thus concluded that a royalty rate that gives rise to such 
concerns cannot be consistent with (F)RAND and “does not stand up to the central 
principle of the RAND commitment – widespread adoption of the standard.”145 
Similarly, in Innovatio, the court held that the determination of the royalty must 
address the risk of royalty stacking; there should be a maximum cumulative royalty 
for the standard as a whole. Accordingly, the court held that “the existing profit 
margin on chips is the likely ceiling on Innovatio's RAND royalty, and is therefore an 
appropriate starting point from which to calculate that royalty”.146 
The German proceedings in both Huawei and Motorola have afforded the ECJ and 
Commission respectively with the much needed opportunity to provide clarification 
on a number of important issues relating to the application of Article 102 to the 
conduct of dominant SEP-holders and the effect of FRAND licensing commitments. 
If such guidance is forthcoming then, combined with the US precedents, invaluable 
assistance is likely to be provided to tribunals and national courts of the EU Member 
States embroiled in these matters as SEP-holders and implementers submit their 
FRAND disputes to them for adjudication.
147
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